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environmental impact assessment document produced as part of the AMDAL process. 
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extractive industry projects. The AMDAL is comprised of the ANDAL (EIA Document), plus 
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CCC 
 
community consultative committee 
CSRM Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining 
 
CRR Community Relations Review 
 
EIA 
 
environmental impact assessment 
ESR environment and social responsibility 
 
JATAM Jaringan Advokasi Tambang (“Mining Advocacy Network”) 
 
NGO non-government organisation 
 
NYT New York Times 
 
PTNMR Newmont Minahasa Raya  
 
SSM 
 
small scale mining 
STP submarine tailings placement 
 
WALHI Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (“Forum for the Environment Indonesia”), a member 
of the Friends of the Earth Network 
 
  
 
 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Minahasa case study 
In its final year of operation, a gold mine located in the North Sulawesi Province of 
Indonesia operated by Newmont Minahasa Raya (PTNMR) became deeply embroiled in 
controversy over allegations of polluting the local Buyat Bay. Some local community 
members alleged that the operation’s submarine tailings had damaged waterways and 
marine life and negatively impacted their health. A protracted conflict involving 
PTNMR, and Newmont as the parent company, various Indonesian politicians and 
government departments, global media, NGOs and local community groups ensued, 
with multiple lawsuits lodged, defended and verdicts appealed. In the process, 
Newmont employees were detained, and one later charged with environmental crimes. 
Despite a series of strong legal victories in favour of Newmont in the Indonesian courts, 
the company’s corporate reputation was called into question on an international scale. 
1.2 Purpose of the assessment 
In 2007, Newmont initiated a global Community Relationships Review (CRR) as a result 
of a shareholder resolution at its Annual General Meeting in Denver. The CRR project 
initially focussed on five operating sites around the world. The Minahasa case study was 
added at the request of the independent Advisory Panel, with agreement from the 
Environment and Social Responsibility (ESR) Committee of the Newmont Board. 
Assessments at the five other Newmont operations involved in the CRR were guided by 
a common scope of work and methodology. The Minahasa case study differs from these 
cases because (a) it is in the closure monitoring rather than operational phase of its mine 
life, (b) it was heading towards closure when Newmont’s environment and social 
responsibility policies and standards were put in place, and (c) there is the possibility of 
multiple ongoing appeals in relation to the Minahasa litigation. With these 
considerations in mind, a different approach was agreed between the Advisory Panel, 
Newmont, Study Directors of Foley Hoag LLP and the CSRM Assessment Team.  
The Assessment Team was asked to prepare an internal report that reviewed lessons 
learned from a company perspective to help provide an initial (albeit solely 
organisational) view of Newmont’s Minahasa experience. The intent was to enable 
insights gained from the experience to be integrated into the CRR summary report being 
prepared by the Study Directors, along with insights gained through other case studies. 
Reflecting the agreed scope, this report addresses the following key questions: 
 What was the background context to the Minahasa case study?  
 How did individuals within Newmont experience the Minahasa crisis as it 
developed? 
 What views are held within Newmont about why events unfolded as they did 
and whether/how things could have been handled differently by the company? 
 What key organisational learnings stem from the Minahasa crisis that Newmont 
has taken or should still consider taking forward? 
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1.3 The Assessment Team 
CSRM is an independent research centre located within the Sustainable Minerals 
Institute at The University of Queensland (UQ), Australia. CSRM was established in 
2001 with funding support from UQ and the Queensland Government. Its charter is to 
promote socially responsible practices in the minerals industry and facilitate progress 
towards sustainable development objectives. CSRM had previously been engaged by the 
CRR Study Director to undertake a case study review of Newmont Waihi Gold 
operations in New Zealand, as one of the five original case study sites. 
The research was undertaken with the assistance of specialist consultancy, OfforSharp, a 
management and stakeholder engagement consultancy specialising in the resources and 
infrastructure sectors within the Asia-Pacific region. Its core service areas are: 
stakeholder engagement, conflict resolution, sustainable development strategies and 
frameworks, social impact assessment and informed consensus processes. 
1.4 Methods and sample 
Two senior members of the Assessment Team members completed a rapid desk-top 
review of documentary material, including web-based sources, accessible NGO 
documentation, media files and information posted on the Newmont Minahasa site 
and/or held in Newmont corporate records in order to familiarise themselves with the 
Minahasa case. Some interviewees provided the Assessment Team with additional 
information on specific aspects of the case. This information has not been directly cited, 
largely due to its potential to identify interviewees. 
The research involved 26 individual depth interviews with key Newmont executives, 
current and former managers, employees and consultants who were involved in 
Newmont’s Minahasa experience. A range of interviewees participated in the research, 
including corporate, regional and site-based personnel, across a range of disciplines. 
Approximately one-third of interviewees were Indonesian. Four women were 
interviewed. Thirteen interviews were undertaken by phone and another thirteen face-
to-face, in Jakarta and Perth.  
An initial interview list was negotiated between Newmont, the Study Director and the 
Assessment Team. All suggestions made by the Assessment Team, either by name or 
position, were considered. Some were excluded on the basis of ongoing litigation or 
attorney-client privilege. A few former employees declined to participate in the study, 
and others were either non-contactable or unavailable prior to the report delivery 
deadline. Several additional names were suggested during the interviews, but not all of 
these suggestions could be followed up due to the compressed project timeframe. 
The study had approval from UQ’s Ethics Committee. All interviews were undertaken 
on a voluntary basis, with prior informed consent. All interviews were confidential and 
anonymous, with all transcripts de-identified using a strict data-handling protocol 
developed by the Assessment Team specifically for the Minahasa case study. An 
interview protocol, approved in advance by Newmont and the CRR Study Directors, 
was used to guide the discussions. A thematic analysis of interview data was 
undertaken to identify common themes, as well as exceptions. The qualitative analysis 
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software NVivoTM was used to help test assumptions and verify conclusions. Only non-
identifiable quotes have been selected for inclusion in the report1.  
This report draws on the full range of interviewee perspectives and utilises 125 direct 
quotes across Chapters 3 to 6. Across the board, a relatively even spread of quotes was 
achieved, with no single perspective dominating.  
1.5 Limitations 
The Assessment Team travelled to Jakarta for interviews with current and former 
employees, but did not travel to the PTNMR site, and did not consult community 
members or other stakeholders. The social, legal and operational sensitivities that 
surround this particular case resulted in a more tentative approach to external 
consultations than was the case for the other studies undertaken during the CRR.  
The Assessment Team was all Australian. Interviewers were all senior researchers with 
extensive experience in a wide array of cross-cultural contexts, but some cultural 
nuances may have been missed. While best efforts were made to ensure a gender 
balance in interviews, this was not always possible. On the surface, neither of these 
aspects raised particular issues.  
Considerable time has elapsed since the events of 2004, and although some memories 
are still vivid, there was some ambiguity in different accounts on certain aspects or 
events. It was not within the scope of the process to verify each account, but where 
confusion exists this is flagged in this report. 
The research was commissioned at the end of March 2008 and the first draft report 
required mid-May 2008, representing a compressed timeframe given the complex nature 
of the case and the heightened sensitivities involved, particularly for those employees 
who were detained in Indonesia at the height of the crisis, and those who worked 
closely with them.  
Despite the limitations above we believe the number of interviewees coupled with 
methodology provide confidence in the research findings presented within this report. 
1.6 Report structure 
This report attempts to build layers of understanding about the crisis. This approach 
does result in some repetition as issues are overlapping and interrelated. This is 
unavoidable given the complex nature of the case and in order to achieve full coverage 
of the material and the issues.  
Many interviewees identified contextual aspects that they considered important to the 
case, ranging from international politics to the history of specific local communities. We 
have attempted to introduce this background information in the next chapter. Chapter 3 
then narrates the story of the Minahasa crisis as told by interviewees. It aims to reflect 
their understanding of events as they unfolded by presenting common as well as 
divergent perspectives. Then, through thematic analysis across all interviews, Chapter 4 
illuminates organisational learnings in terms of interviewee perceptions of why things 
unfolded as they did, and what could have been done differently. Chapter 5 explores 
                                                 
1 Best effort has been made to provide verbatim notes. However, in some cases slight paraphrasing 
has been applied to improve clarity. 
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interviewees’ thoughts on what has changed within Newmont and its approach since 
the crisis, and what risks and challenges remain. A brief final Chapter attempts to 
summarise the main themes that emerge from the study, although the nature of the 
material defies simple causal analysis. For the same reason, we have made no attempt to 
produce an Executive Summary of this report. 
1.7 Acknowledgements 
We would like to acknowledge the efforts of Newmont executives, corporate, regional 
and site-based staff and the CRR Study Directors at Foley Hoag for facilitating the 
research process in what remains a sensitive area. Most importantly, we would like to 
thank those interviewed for their willingness to participate and their thoughtful 
comments. The events of 2004 were stressful for all of those involved, and it was often 
an emotional process for individuals to revisit their experiences. The fact that people 
were willing to engage in the research and to speak so candidly suggests a strong desire 
for Newmont to understand and learn from the experiences of 2004. 
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2 Brief Background Context  
The following sections discuss some of the contextual factors that coalesced to influence 
Newmont’s Minahasa experience, from broader socio-political and economic factors at 
the regional and national level, through to local considerations. Many interviewees 
identified the intersection of several of these issues as critical to the way the case 
developed. 
2.1 Demographics and regional history 
The Republic of Indonesia is a unitary state and the fourth most populous country in the 
world at 222 million people (DFAT 2006), with approximately 60% living on the island 
of Java. The island of Sulawesi, which lies east of Java and Borneo, west of the Moluccas 
Islands and south of the Philippines, is significantly less populated hosting around 7% 
of the total Indonesian population (Muhidin 2002, p.17). Sulawesi is divided into six 
provinces, of which the three most northerly are referred to as the Minahasa region. The 
PTNMR mine was located in a remote coastal area of Minahasa, 80km south from North 
Sulawesi’s provincial capital of Manado, where PTNMR retains an office.  
With a population of around 3 million, North Sulawesi is 70% Christian (Muhidin 2002, 
p.17), and Minahasa around 90% (Jacobsen 2002, p.36). These are notable statistics in a 
country that is 88% Muslim with Christians comprising only three per cent of the total 
Indonesian population2. Religious tension is of concern in some parts of Indonesia, 
including Sulawesi. Central Sulawesi for example has been plagued with religious 
tension between Christian and Muslim factional groups, culminating in violent 
exchanges between 1998 and 2001. While most Indonesian communities remain 
relatively tolerant of religious difference (Kray 2006, p.52), religious fundamentalism 
and the infiltration of groups determined to remove Western influences, including 
business, from the country remains a threat to Indonesia’s security environment (Fund 
for Peace 2007).  
Indonesia’s culture is highly diverse, with more than 300 ethnic groups. North Sulawesi 
has attracted migrants from other parts of Indonesia, largely Muslim, seeking economic 
opportunities and to escape ethnic tensions elsewhere. Post-independence 
transmigration programs also encouraged re-distribution of Indonesians from Java to 
less populated areas (Hoey 2003), although North Sulawesi attracted significantly fewer 
transmigration families than other areas of Sulawesi (Muhidin 2002, p.17). Minahasa has 
a strong regional political consciousness, which is thought to have emerged as a result of 
Dutch Christianisation, standardisation of the language and a strong education system 
under colonial rule (Henley 1993). Minahasan communities remain some of the most 
literate people in Indonesia (Beyer 1996).  
Access to food and water supplies are issues in many parts of Indonesia, particularly in 
rural areas and remote villages, as was the case in the villages around the PTNMR 
operations. Public access to healthcare outside the main Indonesian cities remains 
limited, resulting in high infant mortality rates and preventable diseases in many 
                                                 
2 Minahasa’s high representation of Christians is largely as a result of European missionary activities 
throughout Dutch colonisation. 
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locations. Such inequities have contributed to social divisions between rural and 
urbanized populations (Fund for Peace 2007).  
2.2 Indonesian political context 
Indonesia declared independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945 and Sukarno was 
appointed first President of the Indonesian republic in 1949. Indonesia followed a 
neutralist, non-aligned foreign policy under Sukarno and domestically followed a 
philosophy of ‘guided democracy’. After a series of attempts to unseat Sukarno 
(including Western intervention), due in part to Sukarno’s approach to foreign 
investment, General Suharto assumed the Presidency in 1967. Under Suharto, Indonesia 
rapidly opened up to foreign investment, particularly natural resource developments. 
The so called New Order economically reformed the republic with the assistance of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Suharto held power under the New 
Order regime for more than 30 years.  
Suharto exerted control over Indonesian civil society through an authoritarian political 
structure, a corrupt judiciary and a brutal military (Banks 2002). By the mid-1990s, the 
Suharto regime faced a crisis in legitimacy with its state-centred orientation to 
development and security, and economic policies that were widely perceived to benefit 
foreign-linked firms (Schouten 2004). Suharto resigned shortly after the 1997-8 Asian 
financial crises amid widespread demonstrations and violent protests. 
The post-Suharto Reformasi period represented a move towards a more liberal political 
and social environment, including a more open media and greater freedom of 
expression. However, Reformasi carried with it remnants of the Suharto regime, 
including politicisation of security forces, a centralised approach to power and a culture 
of corruption (Romano 2003). The transformation of Indonesia’s military and police 
force from a powerful and corrupt apparatus to a civilian-controlled national security 
force is ongoing, with progress considered to be slow but steady (Fund for Peace 2007). 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2006) considered Indonesia’s 
corruption issues to be endemic with a 2.4 corruption rating out of a possible 103.  
Political transformation through democratic reform and constitutional change has 
continued in recent years, including a move towards regional governance and 
decentralization, giving greater autonomy and powers to regional authorities. Sulawesi 
gained regional autonomy in 2001. Direct presidential elections were first held in 
Indonesia during 2004, the same year as the Minahasa crisis, which saw Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono4 defeat Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the former President Sukarno. 
Tension between national and regional governments remains today, with laws and 
administrative tasks often overlapping. Additionally, village cultural practices remain 
and often govern local decision-making (Bubandt 2005).  
Patriotism and nationalism remain highly charged in Indonesia. While the majority of 
Indonesians remain patriotic, there are many ethnic groups that seek to achieve greater 
autonomy, or independence from central government, one of the main stimulants of 
ethnic violence. Domestic conflicts within Indonesia, for example East Timor, Aceh and 
                                                 
3 On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 representing low levels of corruption. 
4 Yudhoyono was Minister of Mines and Energy under the Wahid government. When Megawati 
replaced Wahid, Yudhoyono was in cabinet as Minister for Politics and Security, before standing for 
the presidency. He was a military commander during the Suharto era. 
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Papua, have been in part exacerbated by the perception of uneven wealth distribution 
along religious and ethnic lines. Tensions surrounding perceived uneven distribution of 
wealth between majority Muslim communities and minority religions continue to 
amplify the perception, at the local level, of discrimination based on religious or ethnic 
identity. 
The events of 9/11 and the Iraq war heightened the existing strong anti-Western and 
anti-American sentiment within Indonesia. There are strong historic and cultural 
reasons for the anti-Western sentiment, particularly related to Western political and 
economic involvement in Indonesian politics and the unpopular macro-economic 
policies that contributed to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Polling conducted by the 
Pew Centre (2005) indicated that the percentage of the Indonesian population with a 
favourable view of the US decreased from 75% in 99/00 to just 15% in 20035. 
Liddle and Mujani (2007) have observed that new democracies, such as Indonesia, see 
popular media become particularly powerful and influential, carrying a moral and 
political weight not seen in western industrialized societies. Suharto’s government had 
previously maintained a strong grip over media reporting. Today there is a wide range 
of media sources. Despite the increase in both choice and independence from the state, 
many commentators have questioned the quality of reporting. Some media outlets are 
considered sensationalist in their drive to acquire greater audience numbers (Hardono 
2002, Heryanto 2001).  
2.3 Mining in Indonesia  
In mining terms, Indonesia is highly prospective and is one of the most resource-rich 
countries in the world, with globally significant operations in many minerals including 
coal, gold and copper. Major global mining companies have been present in the country 
for many years.  
Many large mining operations in Indonesia have been called into question on the issue 
of human rights, in particular issues relating to land, health and environmental impacts, 
their relationship with security forces and the right to development of poor and 
marginalised communities (Banks 2001, Wiriosudarmo 2001). PTNMR negotiated its 
Contract of Work and commenced operations during the 1990s. It is relevant to note that 
international investors, including mining companies, were condemned for being 
reluctant to criticise the Suharto regime’s human rights performance during this period 
(Ballard 2002).  
According to a report by Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) (2007), Indonesia continues to 
lag behind the global trend of new investments despite increasing profits in the mining 
sector, and note a steady decline in exploration investment. PWC found that the key 
issues, as perceived by mining companies include: conflict with forestry regulations, 
taxation issues, regional autonomy, illegal mining and lack of coordination between 
government departments. PWC conclude that the current low level of exploration 
expenditure by large global mining companies will continue until companies are 
satisfied that investment conditions have improved.  
It is well documented that small-scale mining (SSM), which experienced considerable 
growth in Indonesia in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis, is also undertaken 
                                                 
5 Results for 2005 indicated a climb back to 38%. 
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throughout Indonesia. SSM activities in the country are largely unregulated, and there 
are few studies documenting environmental or human health impacts (Kambey, Farrell 
and Young 2001)6. There is widespread activity in North Sulawesi (Blackwood and 
Edinger 2007, Kambey, Farrell and Young 2001), including in the area around PTNMR. 
The ANDAL study undertaken for PTNMR included a section which described the 
history and extent of SSM activities in the area of the mine, with operations reported as 
far back as Dutch colonial times during the 1920s7. 
In recent years, major international reviews of the global mining industry such as the 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development project (IIED 2002) and the World Bank’s 
Extractive Industries Review (2003) have highlighted (in addition to many other issues) the 
use of riverine and submarine tailings disposal methods. The EIR Final Report adopted 
a strong stance against these methods, calling for a ban on the disposal of mine waste 
into rivers and caution on the use of sea disposal (2003, p.31), although the final World 
Bank management response did not preclude their use. The EIR was led by Dr Emil 
Salim, a former Indonesian Environment Minister. Many environmental and non-
government organisations became increasingly globally connected on this issue during 
the late 1990s. Global campaigns such as ‘No Dirty Gold’ included as part of their 
campaign, the alleged effects of STP on local communities and the environment, and 
Indonesian NGO groups were active in the international campaign against this practice. 
2.4  Brief overview of Newmont’s Indonesian operations 
Newmont’s Minahasa Raya (PTNMR) operation is an 80% Newmont-owned8 open pit 
gold mine located 80km south of the city of Manado in the Province of North Sulawesi, 
Indonesia. According to Newmont (PTNMR 2002), the company negotiated the Contract 
of Work in 1986, discovered the Mesel orebody in 1988, and commenced construction six 
years later in 1994. Mining commenced in March 1996, continued for a period of six 
years and ceased as planned in October 2001 when the ore body was depleted. Mineral 
processing from stockpiles continued until August 2004. Closure activities were largely 
completed in 2006, and scientific closure monitoring is now ongoing. PTNMR was one 
of the first large-scale operations in Indonesia to close. Land relinquishment has not yet 
occurred and the site is still under Newmont management control. 
As will be discussed, a key focus of the litigation and media coverage was tailings 
disposal. The ANDAL document (PTNMR 1994) evaluated two tailings disposal 
options, land storage and STP, the latter of which was selected. PTNMR was the first 
mine in Indonesia to use the STP method. The STP system involved a three-stage 
detoxification circuit to target the reduction of cyanide, arsenic and mercury in the 
tailings slurry prior to discharge into the ocean via a pipeline 1km offshore at a depth of 
82 meters (PTNMR 2002). While PTNMR did not use mercury or arsenic to process gold, 
                                                 
6 Kambey, Farrell and Young (2001) identified significantly raised levels of mercury in fish caught 
near areas of high SSM activity in the Minahasan region. 
7 Although the ANDAL document describes extensive SSM activity, and it is understood from other 
documentation that the practice remains an issue in the local area. 
8 The remaining 20% is owned by PT Tanjung Serapung, an Indonesian company. 
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they were given particular attention in the detoxification process due to their abundance 
in the mined ore and their potentially toxic nature (PTNMR 2002)9. 
In partnership with a consortium led by Sumitomo Corporation, Newmont also operates 
Batu Hijau, a large copper-gold mine on the island of Sumbawa. Relative to Minahasa, 
Batu Hijau is approximately four times the size, in terms of tonnage and number of 
employees, and has a 25 year life-of-mine, compared to the short mine life at PTNMR. 
Newmont signed the Contract of Work for Batu Hijau in 1986, the same year as for 
PTNMR. Following ten years of exploration, construction commenced in 1997 
culminating in production in 2000. The STP method is also used at Batu Hijau. At the 
time of the events described in this report, Newmont’s mines were the only operations 
in Indonesia to employ this method of tailings disposal10. Newmont continues to explore 
in other parts of Indonesia.  
2.5 Local communities11 and the PTNMR operation 
Social baseline data regarding the communities surrounding the mine were based on 
studies undertaken by external consultants in 1990 and 1992, and largely recycled in 
subsequent reports. Aspects studied included historical information, population 
distribution and age, ethnicity, education, migration, labour, local trade, land use, 
occupation and income, forestry, agriculture, fisheries, unlicensed mining, housing, 
water, roads, religions, leadership and authority social dynamics, arts and entertainment 
and local organisations.  
Prior to mining, the Contract of Work area included 17 small settlements grouped into 
three main villages: Basaan and Ratatotok (I and II), both located in the Belang 
Subdistrict, and the Buyat Village, located in the Kotabunan Subdistrict. According to 
the ANDAL, the combined population of these villages was around ten thousand people 
in 1992, with approximately half living in Ratatotok I and II. Ethnicity was diverse with 
more than six ethno-linguistic groups in Basaan Village alone. Land access rights under 
the Contract of Work were granted by the Provincial Government, and negotiations held 
with the affected communities on issues of compensation. There were a number of 
disputes from the commencement of mining activities relating to the amount of 
compensation and delays in its payment, issues which were settled in Newmont’s 
favour in a number of District court decisions. 
In terms of religion, Buyat is predominantly Muslim and the other villages 
predominantly Christian. Levels of education amongst the three villages were 
significantly below Minahasan averages, with one percent of village population 
graduating from senior high school, compared with 12% of the Minahasan population. 
There was a history of internal migration prior to PTNMR’s presence, and patterns were 
related to local factors, largely economic. Primary occupations and sources of income of 
residents were farming and fishing. As mentioned, there is also a long tradition of small 
                                                 
9 The ANDAL documentation describes elevated levels of mercury and arsenic in marine sediments 
collected for baseline monitoring prior to operation. 
10 PT Freeport Indonesia’s Grasberg mine has employed riverine tailings disposal since inception, and 
has also been the target of environmental campaigning over this practice. 
11 Information about the social and cultural aspects of the area surrounding PTNMR were sourced 
from descriptive data outlined in documentation provided by Newmont, including the ANDAL 
(1994), Mine Closure Plan (2002) and Now and Beyond SD Report (2002). 
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scale gold mining in the area, with significant migration associated with this activity as 
late as the 1980s and 1990s. Social services and infrastructure in the area were not 
favourable and the health of fishermen was described in the ANDAL as poorer than 
farmers, although detailed health baseline and impact assessments were not undertaken.  
According to the 1994 EIA, Buyat village itself was originally settled in 1897. The 2002 
Closure Plan states that “Buyat village consists of two areas; one inland and one directly 
on the beach. Buyat Beach was originally settled by immigrant fishermen.” The beach 
settlement, which emerged as a focal point in the subsequent controversy (and which is 
referred to throughout this report as Buyat Pantai), does not appear to be mentioned in 
the pre-mining EIA and ANDAL documents. It is understood that there was a small 
number of families based there prior to the operation commencing, and that this number 
grew steadily through the life of the mine. Prior to the crisis in 2004, several 
interviewees estimated that the population was around a few hundred. Interviews and 
other documentation reviewed as part of this research indicate that the community was 
not considered ‘legal’ by the local government, or other villages. Media reports indicate 
that the landowner had not given consent for them to occupy the land.  
Company documentation indicates that the demographic composition and socio-
economic profile of the villages underwent significant changes between 1991 and 2000. 
Sources of income became more diversified with the arrival of PTNMR, with many 
villagers working as employees and service providers to the operation. The mine was a 
significant contributor to the local economy, with a total direct and indirect contribution 
to the Indonesian economy during its operation in the order of US$544 million (Now 
and Beyond 2002). PTNMR was the single largest employer in the area, with preference 
given to local villagers. Company documentation indicates that employment numbers 
peaked somewhere between 500 and 700, with approximately 85% from Sulawesi.  
PTNMR established a Community Consultative Committee (CCC) at the 
commencement of mining operations, comprising village leaders and other influential 
figures from the local area. This group was used to help prioritise community 
development projects and programs. The target areas were the immediate neighbouring 
villages, and the focus was health, infrastructure and education. The Mine Closure Plan 
outlines the community development programs undertaken since operations 
commenced in 1996, including through a development foundation12.  
Closure planning culminated in the submission of the formal Closure Plan in 2002, a 
document developed in conjunction with an environmental consultancy. With regards 
to community aspects, the document indicates that negative impacts of closure were 
identified through various sources, including a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) 
process, data from local institutions, including the police, and information gathered by 
the PTNMR community liaison department and interaction with the operation’s CCC. 
However, limited detail is provided in terms of exactly how the site planned to 
systematically manage, monitor and address the issues raised. 
                                                 
12 In 2001 a dispute arose between PTNMR and the North Sulawesi provincial government over the 
interpretation of tax arrangements in relation to waste material being used for local construction 
activities. Following a series of legal proceedings involving PTNMR, provincial and national 
governments, the issue was resolved through the establishment of a development foundation, the 
Yayasan Minahasa Raya, established by PTNMR with the disputed tax funds. 
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3 The Minahasa Crisis from Interviewee Perspectives 
What views are held within Newmont about how events unfolded? 
The purpose of this section is to give a sense of how the crisis was seen through the eyes 
of individuals within the organisation. The narrative which emerges from the interviews 
reflects many different perspectives, but it provides an account of events before, during 
and after 2004. It is a different view to that which is gained by reading material available 
in the public domain, although centred on the same key events. Interviewee views on 
underlying issues and causes are explored in the next section. 
The narrative is described in several phases which are largely sequential, although a 
degree of overlap does occur. This section is not intended as a comprehensive history, 
and many details of individual interviewee accounts are omitted for the sake of 
brevity13. It is also important to emphasise that there are many other external 
perspectives on the Minahasa events, but as explained in Section 1 these fall beyond the 
scope of this review. Similarly, there were a number of significant reports compiled both 
during and after the crisis on different aspects. Reports referred to in this section were 
mentioned by interviewees in their narratives. 
3.1 Local relationships before the crisis  
Most of those interviewed believed that PTNMR personnel enjoyed largely positive 
relationships with local stakeholders before the crisis, referring to the CCC process as 
well as day-to-day interactions with local communities, including in Buyat Pantai, and 
regional governments. A few observed that the CCC was dominated by relatively 
powerful individuals: “There were religious leaders, local figures, businessmen … large 
landholders … [people with] authority and respect.”  
Many interviewees pointed to a general improvement in living standards for most 
communities living around the mine during its years of operation. However, 
descriptions of the operation’s approach to community development activities were 
partial, or inconsistent. Some described micro-finance and capacity-building activities, 
while others described only infrastructure projects: “… the biggest was the community hall 
for the village heads.” Reflecting on the situation when the crisis broke, several expressed 
concern at the lack of significant visible improvements achieved during operation: 
“When you go to Minahasa, you see a big sign ‘Donated by Newmont’. The sign is bigger than 
the project. The sign is there next to a broken road.”  
According to many interviewees, these formal development initiatives excluded the 
beach community at Buyat Pantai. Several indicated that the Buyat Pantai villagers were 
not represented on the CCC at the insistence of other parties, including the owner of the 
land which they occupied, community leaders from other villages and the local 
government. According to one interviewee, PTNMR adopted the view held by these 
other stakeholders that: “… these people were squatters, trespassing, didn’t have a right to be 
there. Newmont bought into that view of the world.” Despite this, PTNMR community 
relations staff said they maintained contact with the Buyat Pantai community and did 
                                                 
13 There are also several issues that feature in media and other public accounts that were not 
discussed in any detail by interviewees, such as small scale mining, permitting issues and a leaked 
audit that was covered in the New York Times article. 
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attempt to facilitate some basic improvement projects in Buyat Pantai. One interviewee 
said: “We did go in and were trespassing to put in public sanitation, but this was very basic and 
not maintained.” Several indicated that the company was aware of the poor living 
conditions of the Buyat Pantai community. One manager reflected: “People were living in 
deplorable conditions, but [the issues were] not related to STP”. However, it was a commonly 
held view at the time that doing more development work there “… would have put 
Newmont in a position of conflict with the other communities.”  
3.2 Early warnings  
According to several interviewees, allegations about pollution at Buyat Bay were raised 
even before PTNMR operations commenced: “This issue was around … allegation of 
poisoning … in 1996 before the STP started … fish kills which we concluded were from fish 
bombing.” Interviewees also observed that Indonesian NGO groups actively campaigned 
in the area from the start, establishing and maintaining relationships with local 
communities: “NGOs lived with the community of Buyat from 1997.” According to 
interviewees, claims of skin rashes, sickness, and reduced fish stocks attributed to 
Newmont’s tailings disposal in the sea were the subject of protests at the local and 
regional North Sulawesi level in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and were generally 
linked to the community at Buyat Pantai. At one of these protests, campaigners dumped 
fish in front of Newmont’s Manado office, prompting prominent coverage in the 
Manado Post and other local media.  
Relationships with oppositional Indonesian NGO groups were mainly antagonistic. 
Some described efforts made by PTNMR site-based staff to engage with them: “We 
would take them on our boat to the samples and show them how it [sampling] was done … we 
tried to get them to education seminars.” Apparently, little progress was made. Several 
others said that there was no strategy of engagement or communication. One 
interviewee said: “We did a stakeholder map – but it’s not in the Mine Closure Plan – we 
included NGOs but it was edited to only include ‘legitimate’ NGOs – those that support and 
agree with us.” Many interviewees employed the term ‘enemy’ when discussing the 
relationship, for example: “WALHI14 was our enemy. They declared a war before the mine 
started operating.” A few interviewees reported that better relationships were formed 
with local WALHI representatives, who distanced themselves from the main 
campaign when the issue broke in 2004. 
Several international NGO groups also made PTNMR’s use of the STP process a 
campaign issue. However, at this point the issue was still perceived by PTNMR to be 
largely contained to the local and regional context. Despite the sporadic but ongoing 
public allegations, interviewees explained that Newmont personnel were confident that 
the monitoring data demonstrated no issues of concern regarding the marine 
environment in Buyat Bay. One participant summed it up as follows: “Newmont 
Indonesia … considered them [NGOs] to be talking nonsense, and hoped that they would just go 
away.”  
                                                 
14 Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (“Forum for the Environment Indonesia)”, a member of the 
Friends of the Earth Network. 
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3.3 Preparing for closure  
Production from the mine ceased in 2001 and the operation moved into a closure phase, 
with the cessation of processing activities planned for 2004. A few interviewees 
described how closure planning had commenced relatively late: “We only started working 
on the Closure Plan the year before closure.” Several commented that, while strong on 
environmental aspects, the plan was perceived to be lacking in terms of social 
considerations: “Minahasa was a poster child15 for environmental planning for closure … but 
hadn’t put anything into the social aspects.”  
Closure planning sought to re-focus community development activities, with several 
interviewees commenting on a renewed emphasis on infrastructure: “[We provided] 
schools, houses, a hall, road infrastructure etc., but that all started in 2002. We have been there 
since 1996. It was a bit late.” During this time, the Community Relations budget within 
operations was being reduced and staff were being laid off, while the Closure Group 
assumed an increasing role in this area: “At some point Community Relations [for 
operations] was moved out. We were decommissioning the mine and moving people out.” 
Funding for activities was being co-ordinated through different channels, a fact not 
unnoticed by some in the community: “Sometimes the community went to the Community 
Relations team, then they went to the Closure Team. Closure made a decision that had been 
rejected by Community Relations, so the community decided that going to the Closure Team was 
better.” 
As previously mentioned, the Buyat Pantai community was explicitly identified in the 
socio-economic profile section of the 2002 Closure Plan. However, the chapter which 
dealt with the socio-economic impacts of closure and related plans did not specifically 
refer to the beach village. One interviewee reported that the scenario around renewed 
allegations from Buyat Pantai was raised during a risk assessment process undertaken 
for closure planning, but at the time the risk was not considered a high priority.  
As the Batu Hijau operation became the main focus of Newmont’s presence in Indonesia 
and the base for Newmont’s senior regional managers, several interviewees described 
how staff numbers in the Jakarta office (including media, public relations and 
government relations) were substantially reduced16, partly in response to the 
decentralisation of government processes: “Newmont thought that everything was focussed 
in Manado or Batu, and that Jakarta was not necessary.” PTNMR focused on negotiations 
with the provincial and local governments over the technical aspects of rehabilitating 
the site, decisions about asset disposal and formal release of the land back to 
government control.  
3.4 The ‘Perfect Storm’ (early 2004) 
In early 2004, PTNMR site staff were alerted to reports of a sick baby at Buyat Pantai, 
with the child’s condition being linked to PTNMR’s tailings disposal in Buyat Bay. 
Interviewees described how villagers and NGO activists organised protests in Manado, 
leading to a meeting which included government officials, community members and 
                                                 
15 ‘poster child’ usually indicates a prominent positive example  
16 Interviewees provided different explanations about the reduction in size of the Newmont’s Jakarta 
office. Some stated that the office ‘closed’, others described a substantial reduction. It is beyond the 
scope of this report to clarify the exact nature of the change in company presence in Jakarta. 
 14 
company representatives: “At that meeting, they did not ask for doctors or medicine. They 
asked for compensation … for sickness and land. It was a coalition between Buyat Pantai and 
Ratatotok.” Interviewees indicated that since no-one within the company believed that 
the illness was related to PTNMR activities, no agreement was reached: “Newmont was 
afraid that if they gave a donation to Buyat Pantai, then it would be an admission of guilt, rather 
than a contribution to community development.” 
According to those interviewed, the mother and the sick baby were then flown to Jakarta 
by NGOs and a local politician, who used the baby as a central example of the sicknesses 
they claimed were being caused by PTNMR activities. Several suggested that internal 
communication now began to reach regional managers and also Newmont’s corporate 
office in Denver, whose response during a phone call was summarised by one person as: 
“We’ve got all the data, we know there’s no problem environmentally, we’ve done everything we 
can do.” Some interviewees commented that there was a view in parts of the organisation 
that the issue would be confined to the regional papers, but others were more 
pessimistic: “I remember someone saying ‘This is really bad, the people in Denver don’t get it.’” 
On 3 July the baby died. Several villagers from Buyat Pantai subsequently lodged a 
complaint with police in Jakarta about alleged pollution. NGO representatives claimed 
in media interviews held in Jakarta that the baby had died from pollution-related 
disease after an Indonesian doctor announced that the baby’s death and other diseases 
amongst villagers were a result of mercury contamination. The Jakarta-held event, and 
the intense media coverage it generated, was variously described by interviewees as 
“deliberate”, “well orchestrated” and “shocking”. According to one interviewee: “It had a 
devastating impact.” The following day, police announced that they would investigate the 
allegations. The Ministry for Energy and Minerals and the Ministry for Health also 
announced investigations. Some interviewees thought there were higher-level political 
and religious forces at play that helped explain the apparent orchestration of the 
campaign. 
3.5 Responding to a crisis – ‘Project Reputation’17 (mid 2004) 
Interviewees described how, due to the staff reductions in Jakarta, much of the initial 
media contact was directed to the Manado office, which had itself been reduced in 
number. Staff there experienced difficulty in trying to respond to complex accusations 
remotely and with little information: “When the case came in, everything [i.e. press inquiries] 
came from Jakarta. Newmont had no relationships there. Reporters were calling people in 
Manado. There was no face-to-face opportunity. The telephone is not the way to give clear 
explanations about complex issues.” The fact that the focal point was Jakarta caught many 
by surprise: “We never thought that they would attack us in Jakarta.”  
Senior regional management began to realise the potential ramifications of the campaign 
and relocated to Jakarta in order to co-ordinate the response to what was now 
acknowledged as a crisis. They brought in additional external resources and established 
a four-pronged team, structured around legal, environment, media and government 
                                                 
17 The interviews suggest that the term ‘Project Reputation’ came into common use in Jakarta to 
describe Newmont’s response to the crisis. Feedback from some internal reviewers of this report have 
subsequently indicated that this was not a wholly accepted term as it placed ...” a priority on 
Newmont’s reputation rather than on the individuals being unfairly persecuted”.  
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themes. Those involved described how the team met every morning to plan the day’s 
activities in a highly stressful and sometimes heated environment. They indicated, either 
directly or indirectly, that the company was largely unprepared: “No-one was trained for 
this kind of crisis. It was a war room.”  
Interviewees referred to the difficulties in trying to communicate with government and 
media in the absence of established relationships, particularly in the early stages of the 
crisis, whilst on the back foot trying to respond to a series of accusations from the NGO 
groups involved: “The NGOs were clever. They attacked us on Sunday night, when we were off 
the air. Every Sunday they issued a press release, and we were in a defensive position for the rest 
of the week.” In key areas such as environment, permitting and community health, 
required information and data was not readily available internally. Some interviewees 
also identified a tendency at this early stage to not respond publicly: “They were 
intentionally silent. There was heated discussion. Public relations suggested they be quiet because 
it would draw international attention, and aggression is anti-Indonesian behaviour.” The 
findings of the initial public investigations were mixed and confusing, but the national 
attention on the case remained high as the country also geared up for a national election. 
Newmont personnel working in Indonesia for Newmont commented on the increased 
tension in the community at large, with many of their family and friends believing the 
accusations and questioning why they worked for such an organisation: “After the TV 
story my family was crying, ‘You work for that company!’. They believed what they saw.” 
By now Denver was focused on the crisis, and a number of personnel were sent to 
Jakarta over a period of time. For various reasons, and not unsurprisingly, some 
interventions were not received positively by those caught in the middle of the crisis. 
Relationships within the local management group also suffered as pre-existing 
differences were amplified, and some people were moved aside to make way for 
outsiders: “Things went really bad when they brought in a team with no context … the people 
who had been saying there was a problem were pushed aside.”  
3.6 Escalation and the ‘Firestorm’ (mid-late 2004) 
Following the initial press conference, three members of the Buyat Pantai community 
filed a civil case against Newmont, claiming approximately $500 million in damages. 
Some interviewees commented that the broader controversy created tension between 
and within local communities: “The villages became terribly divided between the belief in 
pollution and no pollution.” Old grievances regarding land compensation issues 
resurfaced and became tangled with the environmental accusations. Local fishermen 
reported a decline in people buying fish from Buyat and Ratatatok as a result of the 
pollution claims. 
On 8 September, the Minahasa situation went global with front page coverage by the 
New York Times (NYT), which linked the baby’s death to the Buyat Bay mercury 
poisoning allegations. The story attracted significant additional international attention: 
“The NYT created a firestorm”, which led to angry exchanges between Newmont 
personnel and the paper. The NYT defended their reporter who went on to write a series 
of articles based around trips to other Newmont operations around the world: “The 
articles became vengeful retribution.” Many of those interviewed strongly resent the 
approach taken by the NYT in its reporting of events, linking the coverage to the jailing 
of their colleagues, and observing that subsequent studies and legal outcomes in 
Newmont’s favour were not covered to any significant degree. 
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The following week, Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono won the presidential elections over 
incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri. 
At some point during this phase Denver invoked its formal crisis response process, 
although according to some it was not necessarily designed for this type of situation: “It 
was OK for spills, bombings, kidnappings – but not for a reputational crisis.” One person 
commented that once Denver became more actively involved, Newmont’s response 
became more defensive in nature: “It escalated more when corporate became involved. The 
company was in a state of outrage, and responded defensively when they should have extended 
sympathy. The responses inflamed the crisis rather than calming it.” Several also observed 
that the formal response relied mainly on legal, public relations and technical functions, 
with little community relations expertise involved in formulating those formal 
responses. 
In one attempt to provide an avenue for resolution with local groups, a move which 
several interviewees described as generating heated internal debate, a senior corporate 
representative travelled to Jakarta and Minahasa with representatives from two North 
American NGOs. Following a series of discussions, on 21st September they held a town 
hall-style meeting with representatives of local communities in Manado, including a 
large delegation from Buyat Pantai and some of the main protagonists in the local 
protests. However, even though dialogue continued with the US-based NGOs for some 
months in an effort to commission an independent health assessment of local villagers, it 
proved too difficult and interviewees perceived that the process was overtaken by 
events: “It fell apart after that. It shifted from a community relations focus to environment and 
legal.” 
On the days after the meeting in Manado, the Indonesian police detained five PTNMR 
employees in custody, with Newmont Indonesia’s President Director prohibited from 
leaving the country. People commented that the arrests provoked a renewed sense of 
outrage and concern within the company, especially given the conditions under which 
people were held: “It was a very bad place, no mattress, nothing, very awful.” This period 
saw a strengthening of the legal response and a determination to get the employees 
released: “It was heartening to see Newmont really get behind its employees.” The detainees 
were released after more than 30 days, soon after Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono was 
sworn in as President, but they remained under house arrest. 
The project team in Jakarta continued to respond to the deluge of local and international 
media coverage, and to support the legal and government defences. A complex 
combination of criminal and civil legal proceedings involving government, NGOs, 
affected communities and Newmont developed. Amongst the other legal processes 
underway, Newmont launched a defamation action against a local NGO representative. 
This was the subject of some disagreement internally, with one interviewee describing it 
as a “David and Goliath event” and attributing it to “a strong sense of vengeance within 
Newmont … which really coloured rational strategy.” In the ongoing legal cases, the Buyat 
Bay villagers withdrew their damages claim, and then the Jakarta District Court ruled 
that the police investigation was illegal. Judges hearing the defamation case also found 
in Newmont’s favour. However, Newmont Indonesia’s President Director was indicted 
on criminal charges of pollution in the Manado District Court, and a civil claim was 
launched against Newmont by the new Environment Minister. The pattern of claim and 
counter-claim continued. 
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3.7 A slow turnaround  
A number of globally-recognised and independent organisations including the 
Minimata Institute and the World Health Organisation conducted investigations into the 
allegations. When these reports were published, they did not reveal elevated mercury 
levels. Newmont used this information and additional data in its media campaign: “We 
stopped being quiet and gave the media the data … and held public meetings with them.” 
Participants felt that this was gradually starting to have an effect in creating more 
balanced coverage: “October/November 2004 was when we started to change their attitude.” 
Newmont also arranged for national and international media to visit the site. “The Wall 
Street Journal ran a good article. This helped to change some international attitudes.”  
Later in 2005, interviewees explained how local NGO groups arranged for the voluntary 
relocation of the majority of the Buyat Pantai villagers to Duminanga, a distant site 
described by interviewees as “very destitute – even worse than where they were”. One 
interviewee estimated that two-thirds of the community moved, while one-third stayed 
behind and distanced themselves from the pollution claims. The move itself was 
graphically described by several interviewees, who were clearly disturbed by what they 
observed. The relocation was broadcast on national media18, showing houses being 
burned and documenting the exhumation of the baby’s body, which was reportedly 
transported to the new location.  
In 2005, the panel of judges hearing the civil suit brought by the Ministry of 
Environment ruled that the government and Newmont must conciliate under the terms 
of the Contract of Work. This process led to the negotiation of the Goodwill Agreement, 
announced in February 2006. Parties agreed to independent scientific environmental 
monitoring of the post-closure environment, as well as sustainable development 
programs to be undertaken in the local area. Development activities do not extend to 
Duminunga. Several people reflected that the Agreement was the circuit-breaker which 
helped progress a resolution of sorts. 
According to several interviewees, at some stage the company worked with the local 
government to legalise the status of the remaining community at Buyat Pantai. There 
were also reports that several families drifted back from Duminanga, where conditions 
were reportedly difficult: “I have heard that they are starving and need food. That’s the irony. 
They have been abandoned [by the NGOs that had facilitated their relocation].”  
In April 2007, three years after the initial protests in Jakarta, Newmont Indonesia’s 
President Director was acquitted of criminal charges. At the time of writing this report, 
further legal action remains a possibility. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The footage was also rebroadcast during Australian current affairs reporting of the case, and was 
reviewed by the research team as part of the desktop exercise. 
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4 Interviewee Perspectives on Organisational Learnings 
What views did the Newmont interviewees have about why events unfolded as 
they did? 
While a number of complex external factors came into play in a short space of time 
during the Minahasa crisis, the majority of interviewees concluded that in retrospect the 
escalated nature of events was also a result of pre-existing organisational conditions and 
decisions rather than external factors alone. They each had different opinions about 
whether or not Newmont could have avoided the crisis. Some believed Newmont could 
have avoided it altogether, while others said it was virtually impossible to deal with the 
magnitude of the crisis due to the many causes and compounding factors involved. 
Many interviewees concluded that, in retrospect, if Newmont had been better prepared, 
had responded more strategically to events as they unfolded in the early part of the 
crisis and had enjoyed stronger relationships with key stakeholder groups, the crisis 
could have been better contained, if not averted in the first place. 
It should be noted that the comments on organisational processes and policies reflect 
individual perspectives and understandings, based on discussions focussed on the 
Minahasa events. They are not necessarily representative of the wider Newmont 
organisation. 
4.1 Approach to relationships not strategic or proactive enough 
with some groups 
Aggregated interview data indicates that most interviewees believed that Newmont’s 
approach to relationships with key stakeholder groups was not strategic enough. Many 
said it was too late to establish relationships once the crisis was underway: “We were 
trying to establish relationships when there was a problem.” Newmont found itself working 
to establish relationships that interviewees now believe should have already been in 
place and nurturing relationships that were weak. Many interviewees, mainly 
Indonesians and those with a long history in the country, emphasised that relationships 
demand particular and special attention in the Indonesian context, and that the 
company did not always appreciate the dynamics involved. Relationships with local 
communities, NGOs, media and government were frequently cited by interviewees as 
having contributed to the crisis. Some interviewees spoke about all of these, others 
focused on one or two as primary contributors. 
4.1.1 Buyat Pantai 
The majority of interviewees pointed to Newmont’s relationship with Buyat Pantai 
people, and in particular a sub-group within this village, as the root cause of the crisis: 
“It’s complicated, but still, there is a root cause … there were a small group of people who were 
not happy.” Most now conclude that the decision for PTNMR not to formally engage 
with Buyat Pantai as a legitimate stakeholder group provided fertile ground for other 
groups to further their own objectives. One interviewee said: “There was faulty stakeholder 
assessment and strategising [in relation to Buyat Pantai] from the beginning.” While this was a 
commonly expressed view, a few still believed that Newmont had limited room to 
manoeuvre on this issue: “I don’t feel that we disenfranchised them. The other communities 
did.” 
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While the situation in Buyat Pantai was highly complex, there was some recognition 
amongst interviewees that if relationships with the main villages such as Ratatotok were 
more robust, discussions about how to build relationships with disaffected people in 
Buyat Pantai could have been broached. A few interviewees reported that the company 
overestimated village-level support for the operation, and pointed to underlying 
tensions and dissatisfactions that were largely overlooked throughout the life of the 
mine. These interviewees made several suggestions about how engagement with Buyat 
Pantai might have been achieved, for example through greater inclusion in the CCC, a 
tailored community development strategy, facilitating land tenure either at Buyat Beach 
or another location, or through an inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogue process. In 
retrospect, many believe that the company did not adequately explore opportunities 
with Buyat Pantai people. One interviewee said: “After two-thirds of the community moved 
away [to Duminanga], Newmont helped those who stayed to secure legal rights to occupy the 
land – we didn’t try to do this earlier.”  
Many of those we spoke to perceived that NGOs worked with vulnerable and 
disaffected individuals and groups in Buyat Pantai to orchestrate a campaign against the 
company. Some believed that at the end of the day, NGOs were more patient than the 
company when it came to building relationships with disaffected groups, more willing 
to get to know them, live amongst them and establish relationships based on trust and 
mutual benefit. One commented: “NGOs had been supporting groups of locals for a long time 
– they had gained their trust. Newmont didn’t.”  
4.1.2 NGOs  
Many interviewees reported that, at the time of the crisis, the company had oppositional 
relationships with some NGOs. This applied particularly to those with radically 
different perspectives, with Newmont’s approach summed up by one interviewee as 
“don’t talk to your opponents and delegitimise your critics.” Another explained that “Jatam19 
and WALHI became the enemy. The strategy was: we’re not going to deal with them.” Several 
reported that they had tried to engage these NGOs before the crisis, but had been 
ostracised by others inside the organisation: “Somehow, people talking to them [NGOs] were 
seen to be on the wrong side … seen to be sleeping with the enemy … there was incredible 
antagonism and suspicion.” Another suggested that “We needed to be proactive to counter 
this. They need information.” On reflection, several interviewees suggested that third-
party facilitation processes, or the development of long-term strategies of education and 
communication on mining and STP may have helped the situation. However, others see 
this engagement with these groups as an impossible goal. A few interviewees felt that 
even while a relationship might not have been possible, at the very least the company 
should have had more open channels of communication with NGOs involved in the 
crisis. One interviewee said: “Mining companies have a lot of critics. If we have a relationship 
that does not mean that we need to work together. But, at least we should know each other.” 
Several interviewees believe that there is still room for improvement in the area of 
Newmont’s NGO engagement strategy, particularly in relation to groups who are 
disengaged or opposed to mining. 
                                                 
19 Jaringan Advokasi Tambang (Indonesian Mining Advocacy Network Indonesia) 
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4.1.3 Media 
Many interviewees explained that Newmont had few relationships with national media, 
particularly after the Jakarta office was reduced in size, observing that the resulting lack 
of media networks put them in a poor position as the crisis escalated. One interviewee 
said: ”The media said ‘Who are you?’, you never cared about us and now you come to us because 
you need us.” Another suggested that: “Better communication [with the media] all along could 
have meant it might have turned out differently.” The difficulties in the relationship with the 
NYT both in Jakarta and subsequently in the US were highlighted by several 
individuals, with some questioning the aggressive approach adopted: “One big mistake 
was how we went after the New York Times. We girded for war. We went after them.”  
4.1.4 Government 
Many interviewees pointed to problematic relationships with some government 
officials: “There were some bad relationships with mid-level politicians.” Another said: 
“If you dig down, if you go to the problem, we did not have a good relationship with 
government at the time.” Many believed that problematic relationships were 
exacerbated by the organisation’s response to regional autonomy, which involved 
reducing its presence in Jakarta. Others also linked poor relationships to a lack of 
appreciation of the Indonesian political landscape, discussed further below. 
It should also be noted that there was a change in national government mid-way 
through the Minahasa crisis, as described in the previous section. Several interviewees 
explained that this caused additional difficulties due to the need to establish 
relationships with completely new individuals during a time of heightened tension. 
4.2 Dominant organisational paradigm  
Interviewees pointed to several underlying causes for weak relationships, including an 
organisational paradigm that was seen as being dominated by a production, technical 
and environmental compliance orientation. While it was acknowledged that these 
aspects are vitally important for any mining operation, in the case of Minahasa this 
orientation was considered to have left little room for comprehensive consideration of 
local-level community relations and broader socio-political aspects.  
One senior executive said: “I was on top of what was going on operationally. I didn’t know 
about the community … about the Buyat Pantai group.” When describing his impression of a 
presentation from a visiting senior corporate executive, one locally-based interviewee 
reflected that “Our goal was not about social licence, but how to produce as much gold as 
possible.” While the responsibility for community relations lay with the site General 
Manager for most of the operating period of the mine, several interviewees indicated 
that most of the people who occupied that position were focussed principally on 
operational and technical issues. One interviewee suggested that “Management of the site 
didn’t seem to understand what we were trying to do with the community.”  
Interviewees also described the Minahasa operation as orientated towards dealing with 
quantitative data and facts, rather than also dealing with qualitative data including 
community perceptions: “Mining companies need black and white. Engineers need to have 
measurable quantities.” This technical orientation resulted in a tendency to avoid 
addressing perceptions about technical issues. Several interviewees reiterated the 
quality of the environmental data they held regarding the conditions of the bay: “We had 
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incredible data which demonstrated quality … real quality monitoring, particularly in relation to 
marine life. That was extensive.” Others observed that this technical confidence led to a 
lack of public response. 
Some interviewees reported that the company was very focussed on compliance: 
“Newmont always worked according to the law. In regulation we were always doing 
right. In the community perspective we did not.” Across the board, they had confidence 
in Newmont’s technical ability and level of environmental compliance. There was 
considerable pride in the organisation’s environmental track record at Minahasa. Some 
employees said they were initially unsure of the facts regarding pollution and health 
impacts, so took the time to analyse the data for themselves. One interviewee said: “I 
needed to study the data and make my own decision. I promised my family, if I find 
anything wrong, I would quit. I didn’t.” While the company had an environmental 
compliance orientation, there were few compliance imperatives in the social dimension, 
from either the government or the company. Thus, there was no legal or policy 
framework demanding attention to social aspects and no formal corporate framework to 
fill the gap, as Newmont’s corporate systems were not yet in place. There was 
recognition amongst some interviewees that a compliance approach to meet ANDAL 
requirements left a gap when it came to community requirements.  
Considering all of the interview data, it appears that Newmont may not have foreseen 
the potential for social aspects to become high risk because the dominant organisational 
paradigm was not responsive to these issues. Once problems did emerge, the response 
continued to be from an environmental, technical and compliance paradigm.  
4.3 Lack of organisational systems and processes 
The dominant paradigm and the absence of regulatory and corporate imperatives in the 
socio-political and community sphere contributed to a situation where risks were not 
adequately considered, understood, resourced, managed or monitored by the 
organisation before and during the crisis. In other words, the interviews suggested that 
there were few formal plans or management systems in place for community, NGO, 
government relations or media engagement.  
4.3.1 No formal approach to assessing social and reputational risk  
There appears to have been no formal operational-level social risk assessment that might 
have flagged the risk of perceived health impacts related to STP – the lead issue in the 
crisis – despite the ongoing complaints. One interviewee said: “The story had been 
bubbling for years, and it finally got traction.” Another observed that “It all started a long 
time before the crisis even occurred.” A risk assessment might have, for example, identified 
health issues at Buyat Pantai and devised a strategy to improve the surrounding 
environment. Many interviewees recognised this risk assessment gap: “We didn’t 
eliminate our weak points. We need to look and focus at potential weak areas.”  
A common theme in the interviews was that the organisation had tended to behave 
reactively, rather than proactively. One interviewee explained: “There was concern about 
different issues – [perceptions of] mercury, submarine tailings. [Once issues had escalated] we 
went out with the science in a big way – fact sheets etc. By then it was too reactionary … maybe 
if we’d gone out before … We should have had a consistent program to try to eliminate the NGO 
scare tactics.” Another said: “We knew in 1995 that they [NGOs] didn’t like tailings in the sea. 
We should have prepared. We should have seen the potential. Instead, [PTNMR] environmental 
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personnel were being made redundant.” There was overwhelming acknowledgement 
amongst interviewees that the organisation overlooked non-technical risks. 
This is not to say that no-one foresaw the potential of the crisis. However, raising the 
possibility of worst case scenarios was seen as “being alarmist”, rather than being 
accepted practice in order to determine whether adequate controls were in place. Several 
interviewees said concerns were raised, but ignored. On the ground, they felt that 
corporate office was not listening. “The guys at Denver fell back on their evidence, said ‘we 
have no case to answer’.” 
Although some interviewees reported that individuals and small groups within the 
organisation did their own risk assessments, there appears to have been no co-ordinated 
exercise that focussed on the socio-political context from a holistic or institutional 
perspective. Without a rigorous and multi-disciplinary risk assessment, there was no 
trigger for putting in place proactive strategies to address worst case scenarios: “We just 
hadn’t planned for something of this magnitude. We didn’t have a crisis management plan.” 
Whether a socio-political risk assessment would have identified the confluence of factors 
that came into play during the crisis is unknown, but the organisation was not well 
positioned.  
4.3.2 Limited access to information during the crisis 
There was broad agreement amongst interviewees that the lack of systems meant that 
the organisation did not have quick access to information to refute claims on a factual 
basis in two key high risk areas: environment and community health. 
While extensive environment data existed, and was the basis of internal confidence that 
there was no problem in that regard, it was apparently not easily accessible to those that 
needed it. “It took us three months to just work out where all the bits of paper were. We didn’t 
have all key correspondence in one place – people only knew bits and pieces of the puzzle.” 
Another interviewee said: “We had to compile data, evidence and documents before we could 
say something in the media. That took time. Information was everywhere, not together.” The 
situation with health data was much worse, as community health data that had been 
collected was inadequate. One interviewee said: “Some of the [social] data was there in the 
initial environmental impact assessment. That was the baseline. We did some more work on that 
in 2001, but it wasn’t enough for the depth of the project.” 
Interviewees concluded that the company’s delayed public response exacerbated the 
crisis. There was a strong belief that if the company had been able to provide key 
stakeholder groups access to information on environment and community health in the 
early stages of the crisis, then the situation could have been better contained. One 
interviewee said: “It took us a long time to get our message out.” 
4.4 Approach to community relations not strategic or 
comprehensive enough 
Several different issues were raised in relation to the company’s approach to community 
relations at Minahasa. Issues related to skills and capacity, continuity and ability to 
influence operational and company processes. 
Several interviewees raised questions about the capacity and capability of some 
Newmont personnel who had direct or indirect responsibility for community relations 
and development, at various points of the operation’s life. Several also shared concerns 
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about under-resourcing and lack of capability as a consequence of an organisational 
paradigm that did not sufficiently prioritise community relations and development. One 
interviewee said: “The company had good intentions, but the way they did things … there 
wasn’t enough discipline around the way they went into communities.”  
Several of those interviewed described a situation where there were different streams of 
development monies flowing to the main villages, including from operational programs, 
a foundation, and then closure programs, with no clear overarching strategy to ensure 
continuity. One said: “There was no clear agreement with the people about what we would do 
[in the community]. People just thought they would get money.” Interviewees reported that 
the approach was somewhat disjointed and ad-hoc. Others described limited 
coordination between community relations and development functions, in particular 
during the transition between operations and closure: “There was conflict between 
Community Relations and Closure. There was a different approach.” Despite this, many felt 
that significant contributions had been made to the majority of the community: 
“Generally, they [PTNMR] did a lot of good things for the community – they were trying.”  
Several interviewees mentioned that the mine had seen four General Managers in its 
short life, and observed that on top of an already ad hoc approach to community 
relations, this did not provide a stable base for building relationships. In relation to the 
change of management, one interviewee said: “It was a bit disjointed, and none of them had 
previous Indonesian experience.” The issue of cultural integration is further discussed 
below. 
Several interviewees also reported that community relations specialists were not 
involved early in the project to flag potential community relations risks. One 
interviewee explained: “We had no knowledgeable people on community relations during the 
project development phase or early in the operation. No-one considered potential conflict points 
within the communities.” Another interviewee commented that if community relations 
specialists were involved in the decision-making about the location of the pipeline, they 
may not have supported a location that hosted a beach fishing community. Reflecting on 
the subsequent crisis, several interviewees suggested that the marginalisation of the 
Community Relations function within organisational decision-making processes may 
have contributed to the challenges that Newmont faced. 
4.5 Challenging internal dynamics 
4.5.1 Ambiguity in areas of responsibility, control and liability  
There were several themes from the interview data that relate to responsibility, control 
and liability, including the role of the Denver office, lines of accountability within 
Indonesia and regionalisation of functional areas, each discussed briefly below. 
Interviewees had different perspectives on the roles that the regional and corporate arms 
(usually referred to as the Denver office) had during the crisis. This ambiguity appeared 
to negatively impact the organisation’s ability to respond effectively to the crisis as lines 
of communication and areas of responsibility were unclear. 
Interviewees indicated that organisational arrangements in Indonesia further 
complicated lines of accountability. One interviewee said: “The chain of command was 
fractured.” Many interviewees observed that people with liability had no control. Those 
with day-to-day responsibility had limited access to those with functional decision-
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making capability, and those with decision-making capability had limited engagement 
in local contexts. The Assessment Team was unable to fully understand organisational 
reporting arrangements, but found much inconsistency amongst interviewee 
explanations. Organisational arrangements were seen as causing (and continuing to 
cause) confusion and anxiety for some employees, particularly those working at an 
operational level.  
Regionalisation of non-operational functions occurred in Newmont from around 2003. 
This meant that functional areas such as environment and community relations no 
longer reported directly to General Managers (GM) at the operational level. Instead, 
community relations and development managers reported regionally, with a dotted 
reporting line to the local GM. While there were issues before the restructure when GMs 
had sole responsibility for community relations, sometimes with limited expertise or 
experience in this area, many interviewees indicated that the regional restructure was 
also problematic for PTNMR in terms of how things worked ‘on the ground’ at an 
operational level.  
4.5.2 Blockages in transfer of knowledge and communication  
Based on the interviews, it would seem that the organisational structure did not support 
a good flow of information from sites to regional and corporate offices and from 
corporate offices to sites. Some interviewees, particularly those working on the ground 
at Minahasa, said that they knew and had tried to elevate some of the issues that later 
became central to the crisis, such as the company’s approach to community 
development in Buyat Pantai. One observed: “Our employees and community relations 
people, they were mates with the Buyat Pantai people … the guys on the ground could see all this 
stuff but it wasn’t translating into the organisation.”  
Several suggested that information that had been prepared by site personnel for the 
closure plan had not been included in the final draft, including stakeholder maps and 
details about social risks of closure. One interviewee said: “Local people [at the mine] had a 
hard time getting their voices heard.” One practical explanation for this was proficiency in 
English. Several, but not all, Indonesian interviewees reported that language was 
sometimes an issue when putting forward arguments in the context of an organisation 
where English proficiency is required: “I know who to talk to, but it’s difficult to argue. For 
me, it’s difficult to argue in English.” Language aside, several said that no-one was 
listening to them when they tried to raise issues that were of concern to them. One 
interviewee said: “Indonesia is a complicated situation – people up the chain need to 
understand the complexities of working in these situations, the people on the ground need to 
know how to feed that information up to senior management.” A lack of systems, in addition 
to an organisational structure with a high degree of ambiguity in terms of lines of 
responsibility for social and community relations meant some local knowledge 
remained ‘untapped’.  
4.6 Issues with the overall crisis response 
Interviewees described Project Reputation in terms of day-to-day survival, rather than a 
strategic response, particularly as the escalation occurred. Many people observed that in 
the face of the Minahasa crisis, the company adopted a legalistic response, particularly 
after Newmont employees were jailed, without adequate exploration of alternative or 
complementary strategies. One interviewee said: “In dealing with the case, Newmont chose 
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only the legal avenue. There was a non-litigation process that we could have explored … It’s good 
to have a legal mindset, but not everything should be settled in court. By talking, we can work to 
resolve some issues” The one attempt to engage with local community groups at the 
height of the crisis did not appear to be integrated with the rest of the formal company 
response, nor was it fully supported by some site and regional management. Several 
interviewees observed that because the legal response dominated, the company 
overlooked other aspects, such as community relations. However, some indicated that 
the organisation orientated towards a more legalistic response because it provided the 
maximum level of protection for the corporation and employees who were detained and 
later charged.  
While many interviewees believe the legal perspective dominated the crisis response, at 
the same time, the vast majority regarded the legal performance as “exemplary”. One 
said: “There were brilliant people involved on the legal side. This is something that the company 
does very well.” However, many commented that the win-lose paradigm had 
repercussions for reputation and relationships. One interviewee said: “We won in court, 
but we did not win people’s hearts.” Another observed: “We failed to convince and 
communicate with the people. We were too busy convincing the courts.”  
The apparent marginalisation of community relations as a priority function within both 
the organisation and the crisis response team, combined with an adversarial legal 
response, may have prevented the organisation from initially reading to the ‘sub-text’ of 
the conflict. Several interviewees concluded that the issue was not environmental, but 
instead related to development opportunities, respect, and relationships. One said: “The 
Buyat case was more about people not being satisfied about community development, and that led 
to other issues.” Such comments suggest that the organisation may have missed early 
opportunities to respond in a way that addressed underlying issues and built bridges. 
As it transpires, the Goodwill Agreement embodies both the environmental and 
humanitarian dimensions of the conflict.  
4.7 Cultural and national sensitivities 
It is difficult to unpack issues nested within the tensions between Indonesian and 
Western perspectives, Indonesian nationalism, corporate and site priorities and 
interplays of organisational hierarchies. However, many interviewees raised issues 
about the challenges that Newmont faced and, many believe, continues to face in 
Indonesia. One commented: “I don’t think we still have a strong appreciation of some of the 
cultural issues that we face [in Indonesia].”  
4.7.1 Difficulties in building relationships in the context of Newmont’s 
approach to corruption and bribery 
As described earlier, corruption can be an issue in Indonesian politics and government 
bureaucracies. Certain practices and norms within Indonesia contravene Newmont’s 
approach to corruption and bribery. It was apparent from the interviews that 
Newmont’s approach posed several challenges during events leading up to and during 
the crisis of 2004. 
Several interviewees observed that if the company had paid bribes to particular third 
parties, the crisis would have been diffused, and employees released from detention. 
One interviewee said: “I think we probably could have solved it in a day if we were willing to 
pay some money.” There was overwhelming pride in the company for not resorting to this 
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option during the crisis. One interviewee said: “Newmont didn’t pay. There is a policy of not 
paying bribes, no matter what. I have respect for that. It was extraordinary pressure.”  
Some interviewees indicated that the company’s strong anti-bribery stance, coupled 
with weakened political, bureaucratic and media relationships, made it vulnerable 
during the crisis. A few described the complex dynamics around payment of expenses 
and per diems for government officials and media representatives to travel within 
Indonesia to sites for familiarisation and inspections. One interviewee commented: “The 
government allows a per diem. The company doesn’t allow it,” and explained that this did not 
provide many opportunities for some government and media representatives to visit the 
PTNMR operation prior to the crisis. As a result, they were not familiar with the 
operation when questions about environmental performance and impacts on 
community health were raised.  
None of the interviewees advocated a softening of Newmont’s approach to corruption 
and bribery. However, some believe that the company needs to consider how it can 
better maintain key relationships to the fullest extent possible while maintaining its 
strong stance on bribery and corruption. One said: “When you don’t pay off, you need to be 
well networked [in the government]. We weren’t. We need to study how to deal with this. We 
can’t just rest on our conduct in the Indonesian context.” Another interviewee said: “We need 
a country-specific position on it. We need that. We discuss it, but it is a continual internal 
debate. In the meantime, relationships are being damaged by it.” 
4.7.2 Limited Indonesian representation, particularly at the height of the 
crisis 
During the crisis, tensions emerged between Newmont corporate striving to protect its 
international reputation, and the Jakarta crisis response team and PTNMR trying to 
communicate locally, and influence Indonesian public opinion. Interviewees explained 
that the company was focussed on commissioning independent international research 
institutions to clear its name, whereas some in Indonesia would like to have seen 
independent Indonesian experts consulted. One interviewee said: “They just reacted to the 
foreign media … protecting the share price. They forgot this was Indonesia.” However, those 
advocating greater involvement of Indonesian experts also found that, at the time of the 
crisis, the company’s relationships with respected local Indonesian experts were weak. 
Without Indonesian third-party perspectives, many interviewees felt that the company 
was in a difficult position in terms of communicating to Indonesian stakeholders, in 
particular the media and general public: “There was an emphasis on outside expertise. Why 
do we always rely so much on someone outside of the country? They look at things from a 
Western point of view. This doesn’t translate back to the [Indonesian] people.” Another said: 
“We didn’t use local consultants, only foreign consultants. [In the crisis] we couldn’t get help 
from the local Universities. There is expertise, but we couldn’t call on it.” 
Several interviewees also believed that Newmont should have had a senior Indonesian 
as the face and spokesperson of the company, rather than a foreigner. One said: “We had 
a white man as the face of the company [during the crisis]. We should have had an Indonesian.” 
Some of those who raised this issue noted that the company had started to address this 
issue through the appointment of one senior Indonesian executive. However, others 
flagged ongoing issues: “We still have a Western approach to government relations, not an 
Indonesian approach. Most other Western companies have experienced, strategic Indonesians.” 
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Other issues also caused offence to some Indonesians. For example, the company stated 
that it adheres to the highest standards in the country of origin. One interviewee said 
that to some Indonesians this means: “American standards. American values. That’s what 
people thought. This just reinforced a nationalist perspective against Newmont.” 
4.7.3 Gaps in understanding of the Indonesian context 
Several interviewees believed that many decision-makers did not have adequate 
understanding of the Indonesian political context. The example most often cited was the 
decision to reduce the Jakarta office, and concentrate resources close to Batu Hijau. One 
interviewee said: “Newmont’s attitude was that Jakarta was not necessary. Regional autonomy 
had happened, therefore it was not necessary. Actually, this was not right. The central 
government is still strong.” 
Many interviewees, both Indonesian nationals and expatriates with Indonesian 
experience, believed that the company largely perceived the government and 
community claims for compensation as financially opportunistic. Several interviewees 
explained that this attitude damaged relationships: “In Indonesia, people don’t only want 
the money. People also want respect. People are greedy, sure, but people do respect relationships. 
This is a real problem in the company.” Many of those we spoke to with Indonesian 
experience explained that if relationships are not fostered, money will never be enough. 
There was also a strong sense from those with Indonesian experience that once the crisis 
escalated, Indonesian perspectives were dominated by a more Western, largely 
American perspective. This was particularly the case when the crisis escalated and 
corporate representatives became involved. There was a common perception amongst 
interviewees with Indonesian experience that the crisis was fought according to Western 
rules: “I don’t think we fought it the Indonesian way.” 
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5 Post-Crisis Changes, Remaining Risks and 
Opportunities 
How did interviewees perceive the changes that have occurred in Newmont 
since the crisis? What risks and opportunities remain? 
Interviewees were encouraged to reflect on how they perceived Newmont had modified 
its approach since the crisis, and what risks and opportunities remained. 
5.1 What has changed since the Minahasa events of 2004? 
5.1.1 Heightened organisational awareness of community relations and 
development issues 
Many interviewees indicated that there is a heightened awareness of the importance of 
community relations and development at different levels within the company, from site 
to corporate. One said: “Generally speaking, there is a much stronger acceptance and 
understanding of community relations issues now.” Most reported that operations 
increasingly recognise the need to engage specialists in community relations: “There’s 
now an appreciation that you need more specialised people to engage communities, and that they 
need to engage people you like, and people you don’t.”  
Notwithstanding this perceived positive trend, many interviewees discussed the 
importance of building community relations and development skills and competencies 
within the company. Several interviewees highlighted that they held community 
relations responsibilities, but had not as yet participated in formal training in this area, 
and had observed this to be a common trend within the company. Some also believe that 
community aspects are still not accorded enough prominence in terms of organisational 
structure and influence in decision-making processes. “Community Relations has been 
buried under the notion of sustainability, which is so technical at Newmont. It’s all about 
controlling performance and abiding by the law.”  
5.1.2 Development and roll-out of organisation-wide social and 
environmental policies, systems and tools  
Minahasa ceased operation prior to the development and roll-out of Newmont’s current 
social policy framework. Since the Minahasa events of 2004, interviewees indicated that 
significant progress has been made at the corporate level around policy, systems and 
some performance standards. Many of these are supported by generic guidelines and 
tools, most of which have been developed or commissioned by the corporate office. It 
must be noted again, however, that the Assessment Team was not in a position to 
identify or verify to which policy, systems and tools have been developed and 
integrated at the operational level20. However, many interviewees said that the company 
still has progress to make in terms of applying corporate expectations on the ground in 
Indonesia and elsewhere in the company.  
 
                                                 
20 The inclusion of Batu Hijau as one of the sites in the main CRR process allows some direct 
comparisons to be made. 
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The majority of interviewees reported that the company has formal corporate 
expectations in many areas of environment and community relations, and cited one or 
more of the following:  
 stakeholder identification, mapping and analysis  
 social and health impact assessment, with a further move towards integration 
with EIAs 
 risk assessment, including social and political risk and conflict assessment 
 more recently, health impact assessment 
 community development needs assessment 
 government relations plans 
 media relations plans 
 community engagement plans 
 social monitoring 
 evaluation of community relations and development programs 
 closure plans that consider the social dimension required from the 
commencement of operations  
 Stage Gate project planning process, with community relations input. 
 
One interviewee explained that the company is moving towards a more integrated and 
cross-disciplinary approach to baseline and impact assessment and towards formalising 
Social Development Agreements with communities, reflecting a move away from the ad 
hoc approach seen at Minahasa.  
5.1.3 Learnings from Minahasa being applied at Batu Hijau 
Batu Hijau was often cited as an example of how learnings from Minahasa had been 
applied in practice. Different interviewees pointed to several aspects of the Batu Hijau 
operation. For example: 
There was some recognition about the need to plan for closure early in the mine life and 
consider social aspects. One interviewee said: “We’ve learned to plan for closure. It’s already 
happening at Batu, which has more than 25 years [of operating] to go.” 
Several interviewees said as a result of PTNMR’s problematic relationship with Buyat 
Pantai, Batu Hijau was more alert to the need to foster relationships with all community 
members – supporters and detractors. One interviewee said: “Batu is different. We talk to 
people in times of peace. We try to listen more.” 
Several also indicated that as a result of the underlying humanitarian and development 
considerations embedded in the Minahasa case, Batu Hijau is conscious of undertaking 
community development in a manner that does not further marginalise disaffected 
groups.  
Interviewees also reported that the Batu Hijau operation has been working to establish 
relationships with independent third-party experts, many of which are Indonesian 
based, in the event that Newmont’s own data is challenged. One said: “Batu is more open 
to using local knowledge now, because of what happened at Minahasa.” 
In summary, while recognising the ever-present risk that relationships can falter if not 
maintained, one interviewee commented that “we are in a stronger position in terms of 
dealing with stakeholders and the local community”.   
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5.2 Future challenges and opportunities 
Overall, the majority of interviewees thought Newmont had learned much from the 
Minahasa experience. However, many also highlighted that there were still issues that 
required attention: “We have learned, but we have not learned enough.” There were a broad 
range of opinions and interviewees articulated different vulnerabilities and 
opportunities that stem from the Minahasa case. These ranged from the specific issue of 
land relinquishment to focusing on building and maintaining relationships, including 
with stakeholders who have disengaged with the company.  
Several interviewees believe there is an opportunities to carefully examine reputational 
risks and responsibilities around the issue of land relinquishment at the site itself. One 
interviewee said: “When Newmont is gone, what if somebody makes a mess of the reclamation? 
What if they say that’s Newmont? That will make news.” Another interviewee suggested 
that there may be unexplored opportunities for Newmont to support initiatives to 
educate local villages about their relationship with the land once it reverts to 
government ownership. One interviewee explained: “Are we thinking about how to make 
local people feel it is their forest when we go? Our reclamation area is guarded by security. What 
is in their minds? There is still a job to be done to talk about the future there.” 
Most interviewees spoke about the ongoing need to focus on relationships in the 
Indonesian context, including with the media, different levels of government, and the 
various stakeholders involved in the Goodwill Agreement, including local communities. 
Many interviewees reflected on Newmont’s relationship with the Buyat Pantai people 
who relocated to Duminanga, and the relationship this group has with the remaining 
Buyat Pantai families and other village groups. Several interviewees, particularly those 
close to the site context, tentatively discussed the idea of reconciliation with the people 
of Duminanga. However, they also said this was a sensitive topic of discussion not only 
within Newmont but also between Newmont and the Buyat Pantai people living at 
Duminanga and the groups that represent them. They were hopeful that some progress 
towards reconciliation could be made. 
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6 Final discussion 
The internal reading of events described in the previous sections has been developed in 
hindsight and with some reflection by all those we interviewed. While there are 
differences of opinion on specific issues, there is also a degree of convergence in terms of 
a general description of the events of 2004, and some of the many causes and 
compounding factors involved.  
Almost all of those we spoke to recognised that the origins of the crisis lie in the failure 
to resolve the issue of development inequity at Buyat Pantai, a situation that was 
allowed to continue despite awareness of oppositional NGO activity in the village and 
community perceptions that their health issues were related to the mine. Most people 
interviewed said something along the lines of: “We should have done something earlier” or 
”We should have tried harder”, notwithstanding that the villagers’ occupation of the land 
was not considered to be ‘legal’. 
Underlying this apparently simple diagnosis, there are a number of dominant and 
interrelated themes which recurred throughout the discussions, and which interviewees 
identified as contributing to the way in which the crisis developed. 
6.1 Recurring themes 
6.1.1 Organisational focus 
PTNMR’s dominant production, technical and environmental compliance orientation 
was considered to have left little room for comprehensive consideration of local-level 
community relations and development aspects. This manifested itself in several 
aspects of the Minahasa experience.  
Closure planning, which some suggested started too late, focussed mainly on 
environmental matters and did not adequately incorporate community issues. Those 
responsible for planning community development activities during the closure 
implementation phase had limited data and an ad hoc base of previous activity to build 
on. Despite the apparently good relationships with local community leaders, many 
interviewees felt that community relations were not given sufficient attention during the 
early years of the operation. Only when closure became imminent did issues in this area 
come more into focus, but even then most attention was still on environmental 
compliance issues. 
As the crisis unfolded, the company responded to the allegations of pollution and health 
issues from a technical, environmental and legal perspective, particularly after 
Newmont employees were detained. While there was no choice but to respond formally 
to the legal processes, the already minimal focus on underlying issues of development 
inequity and local relationships with key stakeholders was further diminished. 
Company employees with community relations responsibilities indicated that they 
found it difficult to elevate community issues and concerns within the organisation. This 
included limited ability to raise concerns upwards in the organisational structure and 
horizontally from functional disciplines to more operational areas.  
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6.1.2 External relationships 
Relationships with key external stakeholders had not been fostered or had been 
allowed to deteriorate as closure approached, particularly with a reduced company 
presence in Jakarta.  
A lack of established relationships with the government and media in Jakarta left the 
company exposed, a situation exacerbated by the change in government at the height of 
the crisis. In the absence of effective networks, the company ‘felt its way’ with an 
initially tentative response before adopting a more assertive and aggressive stance as the 
crisis escalated. 
Several interviewees observed that the company had not sufficiently addressed some 
critical cross-cultural issues, for example the conflict between the implementation of its 
anti-corruption policy and the common Indonesian practice of paying government 
officials per diem expenses during site visits. The use of mainly overseas experts and the 
fact that there was no senior Indonesian company representative at the height of the 
crisis was considered to have reinforced cultural stereotypes against a background of 
anti-Western and anti-American sentiment within Indonesia during the time of the 
crisis.  
The company was limited in its ability to engage constructively with its critics, 
particularly those in oppositional NGOs. It appears that the importance of maintaining 
relationships and keeping lines of communication open with all stakeholders, 
supportive or otherwise, was not fully appreciated.  
6.1.3 Organisational capacity 
The organization was seen as not having t invested in necessary capacity in a number 
of key areas, including crisis response, which influenced the way in which events 
unfolded. 
The company was evidently not prepared for a crisis of this intensity and magnitude in 
terms of formal risk management or crisis planning. The complex interplay between 
managing local relationships and issues, defending the detained employees as well as 
protecting the company’s own reputation appears to have restricted Newmont’s ability 
to manage the situation. The response was also hampered by an inability to assess the 
cause of the crisis and propose a response to deal with the full range of issues that came 
into play in a compressed period of time.  
It seems that little attention was paid to building capacity in community relations and 
development competencies at Minahasa in the years preceding closure, either within the 
functional areas directly responsible or in management positions responsible for the 
overall operation.  
6.2 Reflections on then and now 
The interviews focused principally on the events of 2004, but participants were also 
asked to consider whether, given all that had happened, the company was still at risk of 
a similar crisis occurring in the future. It was generally acknowledged that Newmont is 
in a stronger position today to anticipate and respond to socio-political and community 
relations risks and issues than it was during 2004. However, several interviewees 
highlighted ongoing areas of vulnerability. Others observed that the sphere of 
community and government relations is inherently challenging and dynamic and that 
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not everything that happens in that sphere can be predicted, let alone controlled. As one 
interviewee commented “It's the one thing that we still don't get ... many things we do with 
respect to communities are not as predictable as other areas”.  
The recognition by many interviewees that ‘it could happen again’ is a timely warning 
against complacency and highlights the need for Newmont to ensure that there is 
continuous and rigorous scrutiny of its social, environmental and governance systems 
and operational cultures. This review has identified a range of key issues and learnings 
that will need to be addressed in driving this agenda forward. 
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